The Situation

It's 5:40 a.m. on a Tuesday. The help desk lead calls: file shares won't open, and there's a text file on several servers with a ransom note. A few laptops show the same thing. Nobody is sure how far it has spread.

The next 24 hours will involve a lot of decisions made under pressure. Most of them are easier if you've thought about them in advance. Here's the order that tends to work.

Hour 0 to 1: Contain Without Destroying Evidence

The first instinct is to shut everything down. Resist it, at least for now.

Do:

  • Isolate affected systems from the network. Use your EDR's isolation feature, pull network cables or disable switch ports. If many systems are hit, CISA's guidance is to take the network offline at the switch level.
  • Disable remote access paths such as VPN and remote desktop gateways, which attackers often use to stay in.
  • Switch to out-of-band communication. Assume email and Teams may be watched. Use phones and a pre-agreed backup channel.

Don't:

  • Power off machines unless you can't isolate them. CISA notes that powering down destroys memory that may hold evidence and, sometimes, encryption keys.
  • Wipe or reimage anything yet.

Hour 1 to 2: Make the Calls

This is where many teams lose time. Three calls should happen early, ideally within the first two hours.

  1. Your cyber insurer. Most policies require prompt notice, and many require you to use their approved incident response firm and breach counsel. Hiring your own firm first can create coverage problems. Your policy's claims hotline should be in your incident response plan.
  2. Outside legal counsel. Breach counsel helps protect the investigation under privilege and tracks notification duties under state, federal and contract rules.
  3. Your incident response firm, through the insurer's panel if required, or your MDR provider's IR team.

Also notify leadership with a short, factual update: what you know, what you don't, and when the next update comes.

Hour 2 to 6: Report and Scope

Contact law enforcement. In the U.S., report to your local FBI field office or the FBI's IC3 (ic3.gov), and to CISA (cisa.gov/report). CISA lists all of these as reporting options. Reporting early can help: CISA advises asking federal law enforcement whether a decryptor exists for the strain you're facing.

Start scoping. Your IR team will want to know:

  • Which systems are encrypted, and which aren't
  • Which accounts were used, especially admin and service accounts
  • Whether data was stolen as well as encrypted (most modern ransomware groups do both)
  • Whether your backups were reached

Preserve evidence. Capture memory and disk images from a few affected machines, and save firewall, VPN, EDR and identity logs before they roll over.

Hour 6 to 12: Check Your Backups and Lock Down Identity

Verify your backups are clean and intact. Attackers often target backup consoles first. Check that backup systems weren't accessed, that immutable or offline copies exist, and that you know the last good restore point.

Reset credentials in the right order. Start with domain admin and other privileged accounts, then service accounts, then everyone else. In Active Directory environments, your IR firm may recommend resetting the KRBTGT account twice. Do this as a planned step, not in a panic, or you'll break things you need for recovery.

Hour 12 to 24: Decide on a Recovery Plan

By now you should have enough information to sketch the path forward.

Prioritize by business impact. Use your critical systems list. Identity and DNS usually come first, then the systems that keep revenue and safety running.

Rebuild, don't just clean. Restore to rebuilt or known-clean systems where you can. Restoring onto a machine the attacker still controls means doing this twice.

About the ransom. Whether to pay is a business and legal decision for leadership, counsel and the insurer. One point to know: the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has warned, in its September 2021 advisory, that paying or facilitating a payment to a sanctioned party can carry sanctions risk. Counsel will need to check that before anything else happens.

The Timeline at a Glance

Window Key decisions Who owns it
0–1 hour Isolate, cut remote access, move to out-of-band comms IT lead / on-call
1–2 hours Call insurer, counsel and IR firm; brief leadership IT director / CISO
2–6 hours Report to FBI and CISA; scope; preserve evidence IR firm with IT
6–12 hours Verify backups; reset privileged credentials IT with IR firm
12–24 hours Recovery priorities; ransom question to leadership and counsel Executive team

Where Teams Go Wrong

  • No phone numbers on paper. If your plan lives on the encrypted file share, it isn't a plan. Keep a printed copy.
  • Calling the insurer last. It can limit your options and your coverage.
  • Rushing to restore. Restoring before you know how they got in often leads to reinfection.
  • Silence. Employees and customers will notice. Short, honest updates beat speculation.

What to Do Next

Open your incident response plan and check four things: the insurer's claims hotline, your breach counsel's number, your local FBI field office contact, and a printed copy stored off the network. If any of those are missing, fix them this week.


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